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“A Zone of Indistinction” 
– A Critique of Giorgio Agamben’s 
Concept of Biopolitics
Summary
This article reconstructs Giorgio Agamben’s concept 
of biopolitics and discusses his claim that the camp is 
the “matrix of modernity”. While this thesis is more 
plausible than many of his critics do admit, his work is 
still characterised by diverse theoretical problems. My 
critique will concentrate on the legalistic concept of 
biopolitics that Agamben endorses and on his forma-
listic idea of the state. This reading of Agamben leads 
to a surprising result. By focussing on the repressive 
dimensions of the state and the sovereign border bet-
ween life and death, Agamben’s work remains com-
mitted to exactly that juridical perspective that he so 
vividly criticizes.
Until recently, the term “biopolitics” as de-
veloped by Michel Foucault was unknown 
beyond a group of experts and scholars.1 As 
Foucault understood it, the term designates 
what “brought life and its mechanisms into 
the realm of explicit calculations and made 
knowledge-power an agent of transformation 
of human life” (Foucault 1979: 143). He dis-
tinguished historically and analytically be-
tween two dimensions of this “power to life”, 
1  Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 
conference Bloßes Leben in der globalisierten Mod-
erne. Eine Debatte zu Giorgio Agambens Homo Sacer 
at the University of Hannover in January 2003 and at 
the Nordic Summer University, Laugarvatn, Island in 
July 2004. Thanks to participants of those occasions 
and Annika Balser, and two anonymous reviewers for 
their comments and criticism. 
namely between the disciplining of the indi-
vidual body, on the one hand, and the social 
regulation of the body of the population, on 
the other. According to Foucault, biopolitics 
marks the threshold of political modernity 
since it places life at the center of political 
order. In this theoretical perspective, there is 
an intimate link between the constitution of a 
capitalist society and the birth of biopolitics: 
“Society’s control over individuals was ac-
complished not only through consciousness 
or ideology but also in the body and with the 
body. For capitalist society, it was biopoli-
tics, the biological, the corporal, that mattered 
more than anything else” (Foucault 2000: 137). 
Furthermore, the introduction of the concept 
of biopolitics by Foucault marks a theoretical 
critique of the “juridico-discursive” model of 
power (Foucault 1979: 82). In this model, 
power is assumed to be exercised as interdic-
tion and repression in a framework of law 
and legality resting ultimately on the problem 
of sovereignty. In contrast, Foucault uses the 
notion of biopolitics to stress the productive 
capacity of power that cannot be reduced to 
the ancient sovereign “right of death”. While 
sovereignty mainly operated as a “subtraction 
mechanism” that seized life in order to sup-
press it, the new life-administering power is 
dedicated to inciting, reinforcing, monitoring 
and optimizing the forces under its control (see 
Foucault 1979).
Thomas Lemke
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 Today, the term “biopolitics” is used more 
and more frequently in scientifi c literature and 
journalistic texts. Mostly it is employed as a 
neutral notion or a general category to point 
out the social and political implications of 
biotechological interventions. This technol-
ogy centred approach ignores the historical 
and critical dimension of the Foucauldian 
notion, how technological developments are 
embedded in more global economic strategies 
and political rationalities. There are two excep-
tions to this trend toward a simultaneous gen-
eralisation and depoliticisation of the notion 
of biopolitics. Both rely on the Foucauldian 
concept of biopolitics, but they do so in very 
different ways.
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) 
attempt to give biopolitics a positive meaning. 
By synthesizing ideas from Italian neo-opera-
ism, with poststructural and Marxist theories, 
as well as with Deleuzian vitalism, they claim 
that the borderline between economics and 
politics, reproduction and production is dis-
solving. Biopolitics signals a new era of capi-
talist production where life is no longer limited 
to the domain of reproduction or subordinated 
to the working process: “The subjectivity of 
living labor reveals, simply and directly in 
the struggle over the senses of language and 
technology, that when one speaks of a collec-
tive means of the constitution of a new world, 
one is speaking of the connection between the 
power of life and its political organisation. The 
political, the social, the economic, and the vital 
here all dwell together” (Hardt/Negri 2000: 
405-6; see also 22-41). In Hardt and Negri’s 
account the constitution of political relations 
now encompasses the whole life of the indi-
vidual, which prepares the ground for a new 
revolutionary subject: the multitude.2
 The picture presented by the second ap-
proach is much more pessimistic. Giorgio Ag-
2  I commented on Michael Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s 
concept of biopolitics elsewhere (see Lemke 2002a).
amben’s book Homo Sacer (1998) depicts the 
present not as the starting point for potential 
projects of liberation, but as the catastrophic 
endpoint of a political tradition that originates 
in Greek antiquity and leads to the National 
Socialist concentration camps. In this book and 
in the following publications like Remnants of 
Auschwitz (1999a) or State of Exception (2005) 
Agamben declares that the camp is the “biopo-
litical paradigm of the modern” (1998: 117). 
In the following I will argue that Agamben’s 
reformulation of the concept of biopolitcs is 
only partially convincing. While his thesis of 
the central political signifi cance of the camp is 
more plausible than many of his critics admit, 
his work is nevertheless characterised by di-
verse theoretical problems. Agamben not only 
fails to make important analytical differentia-
tions, also his conceptual instruments do not 
allow him to account for essential aspects of 
modern biopolitics.
 My critique will focus on the legalistic con-
cept of biopolitics that Agamben endorses as 
well as his formalist idea of the state. On a 
number of points I will contrast Agamben’s 
juridical analysis with Foucault’s strategic ac-
count of modern biopolitics, often by referring 
to the area of biomedicine that Agamben turns 
to when he illustrates contemporary biopoli-
tics.3 My main thesis is that while Foucault’s 
analysis and critique of the biopolitical project 
stresses the link between forms of subjectiva-
tion and political technologies, this important 
dimension is completely lacking in Agamben’s 
work. To put it shortly, Agamben subscribes 
to exactly the juridico-discursive concept of 
power that Foucault has shown to be insuf-
fi cient for the analysis of modern biopolitics.
 In the fi rst part of my presentation, I re-
construct the main arguments of Homo Sacer. 
3  It should be noted though that biopolitics in the Fou-
cauldian sense is a much broader term since it also 
encompasses subject areas like hygiene, demography, 
social welfare and insurance systems.
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Then I will discuss Agamben’s claim that the 
camp is the “matrix of modernity”. In the main 
part of my paper I shall critically analyse some 
theoretical problems, among them the neglect 
of socio-political aspects of the biopolitical 
problematic and the quasi-ontological founda-
tion of Agamben’s theory. I will end up with 
a résumé that sums up the argument.
1. Bare life and the rule 
of exception
Agamben’s point of departure is a conceptual 
distinction that according to him characterises 
Western political tradition since Greek antiq-
uity. He states that the main line of separation 
is not the difference between friend and enemy, 
but the distinction between bare life (zoé) and 
political existence (bíos), between the natural 
existence and the legal status of a human being. 
He claims that the constitution of sovereign 
power requires the production of a biopolitical 
body. Agamben holds that the institutionalisa-
tion of law is inseparably connected to the ex-
posure of “bare life”. In this light, the inclusion 
into a political community seems only possible 
by the simultaneous exclusion of some human 
beings who are not allowed to become full 
legal subjects. At the beginning of all politics 
we fi nd – according to Agamben – the estab-
lishment of a borderline and the inauguration 
of a space that is deprived of the protection of 
the law: “The original political relation is the 
ban” (Agamben 1998: 181).
 Agamben denotes this secret foundation of 
sovereignty with a fi gure from archaic Roman 
law. “Homo sacer” designated an individual 
that may be killed by anyone without being 
condemned for homicide since he or she had 
been banned from the juridical-political com-
munity. While even a criminal could claim 
certain legal rights and formal procedures, this 
“sacred man” was completely unprotected and 
reduced to mere physical existence. Since he 
or she was ascribed a status beyond human and 
divine law, homo sacer became some kind of 
“living dead”.
 For Agamben the obscure fi gure of homo 
sacer marks the fl ip side of sovereign logic. 
As the sovereign is in a position above the 
law, bare life signifi es a domain beyond his 
competence while at the same time it provides 
the basis for the rule of sovereignty. Bare life, 
that seems to be located at the very margin 
of politics, turns out to be the solid basis of a 
political body that decides not simply over the 
life and death of human beings, but who will 
be recognised as a human being at all. From 
this perspective, the production of homines 
sacri is a constitutive but unrecognised part 
of politics. Not a subject that remains outside 
of law, homo sacer is constituted by political-
legal means “to personalize what it excluded 
from the protection of law” (Vismann 2001, p. 
15). Therefore this rightless existence should 
not be conceived of as a pre-societal state. 
Quite the contrary, Agamben makes clear that 
the natural state to which homo sacer seems 
to be thrown back is not a residuum of the 
historical past but the result of social relations. 
Bare life does not refer to a natural, original or 
ahistorical nakedness but presents an artifi cial 
product, a concealing bareness that hides so-
cial markings and symbolisations (Agamben 
1999b; Lüdemann 2001).
 To be clear: Agamben does not use the 
fi gure of homo sacer for a historical recon-
struction of legal procedures and institutions.4 
Rather, he applies it as a theoretical concept 
that is supposed to inform political analysis. 
As a consequence, Agamben is less interested 
in the question whether in antiquity human 
beings were indeed confronted with this kind 
of ban; he is more concerned to display the 
political mechanism of rule and exception, 
bare life and political existence. He analyses 
the paradoxical structure of sovereignty that 
4  For a comprehensive critique of Agamben’s interpreta-
tion of ancient legal texts see Fitzpatrick 2001. 
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operates by a suspension of law: the decision 
about the exception of the rule.
 Here we have to note the fi rst difference 
from the concept of biopolitics as Foucault 
uses it. According to Agamben politics is al-
ways already biopolitics, since the political 
is constituted by the state of exception, in 
which bare life is produced. For Foucault, on 
the contrary, biopolitics is something much 
more recent: it marks a historical shift in the 
economy of power that dates back to the 17th 
and 18th century. While Foucault analytically 
distinguishes between biopolitics and sover-
eignty, Agamben insists on their logical con-
nection: he takes biopolitics to be the centre of 
sovereign power. In this light, modernity is not 
marked by a break with the historical tradition, 
but it only generalises and radicalises what 
was always present in the beginning of poli-
tics. Nevertheless, modernity is different from 
pre-modern times insofar as bare life, which 
was once located at the margins of political 
life, is now occupying more and more space 
inside the political domain. As for the present, 
Agamben diagnoses a collapse of the rule into 
the exception and of politics into life.
 Agamben’s reconstruction of the intimate 
relationship between sovereign rule and bio-
political exception leads to a disturbing result. 
Agamben’s thesis that the camp is the “hid-
den matrix of politics” (Agamben 2001a: 48) 
claims an inner link between the emergence of 
human rights and the establishment of concen-
tration camps. In this light there is no safe and 
secure borderline that separates parliamentary 
democracies and totalitarian dictatorships, lib-
eral states and authoritarian regimes. This is 
Agamben’s fi rst provocation that we will dis-
cuss in more detail now.
2. The camp as the matrix 
of modernity
Agamben’s thesis that the camp is “the hidden 
paradigm of the political space of modernity” 
(1998:123) implicitly refers to Foucault’s his-
tory of the prison and his analysis of the pano-
pticon in Discipline and Punish: “By paradigm 
I mean something very precise, some kind 
of methodological approach to problems like 
Foucault takes for example the panopticum as 
a very concrete object while at the same time 
treating it as a paradigm to explain the larger 
historical context” (Agamben 2001b: 19). Like 
Foucault’s genealogy of the prison that is at the 
same time a history of the present, Agamben’s 
analysis of the camp does not refer to an ar-
chive of memories but to an “event that repeats 
itself on a daily basis” (Panagia 1999). In this 
perspective, the camp is not a historical fact or 
a logical anomaly but a “hidden matrix” (Ag-
amben 1998: 166) of the political domain. Like 
Foucault, Agamben tries to make visible the 
underlying structure in order to better conceive 
the present political constellation. For him 
the camp is less a physical entity surrounded 
by fences and material borderlines. Rather, 
it symbolizes and fi xes the border between 
bare life and political existence. In this view 
“camp” does not only refer to the concentra-
tion camps of the Nazis or the contemporary 
urban ghettos, in principle it denotes every 
single space that systematically produces bare 
life: “The camp is the space that is opened 
when the state of exception begins to become 
the rule” (Agamben 1998: 168-9; emphasis in 
orig.). In other words, Agamben fundamentally 
displaces the traditional meaning of “camp”. 
The camp that in the past was an expression 
of the difference between friend and enemy, 
symbolises, in Agamben’s work, the state of 
exception where law and fact, rule and excep-
tion overlap.5
 “The stadium in Bari into which the Italian 
police in 1991 provisionally herded all ille-
gal Albanian immigrants before sending them 
5  In German the term for “camp”is “Lager”. The “overlap-
ping” of fact and law may be translated as “sich überla-
gern”, the displacement of meaning as “verlagern”.
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back to their country, the winter cycle-racing 
track in which the Vichy authorities gathered 
Jews before consigning them to the Germans, 
[…] or the zones d’attentes in French interna-
tional airports in which foreigners asking for 
refugee status are detained will then all equally 
be camps. In all these cases, an apparently in-
nocuous space […] actually delimits a space in 
which the normal order is de facto suspended 
and in which whether or not atrocities are com-
mitted depends not on law but on the civility 
and ethical sense of the police who temporarily 
act as sovereign” (Agamben 1998: 174).
 According to Agamben, modern biopolitics 
is “double-sided: the spaces, the liberties, and 
the rights won by individuals in their confl icts 
with central powers always simultaneously 
prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of 
individuals’ lives within the state order, thus 
offering a new and more dreadful founda-
tion for the very sovereign power from which 
they wanted to liberate themselves” (Agamben 
1998: 121). It is the same reference to “bare 
life” that in liberal democracies results in the 
pre-eminence of the private over the public 
sphere, while in totalitarian states it becomes 
a decisive political criterion of the suspension 
of individual rights. But even if both forms of 
government rely on the same political sub-
stance – bare life – it does not necessarily mean 
that they are equal in normative terms. Most 
commentators fail to see that Agamben neither 
diminishes the differences between democ-
racies and dictatorships nor devalues liberal 
rights of freedom and participation. Rather, he 
wants to show that the democratic rule of law is 
by no means an alternative project to the Nazi 
regime or the Stalinist dictatorship, since the 
latter radicalise biopolitical tendencies that ac-
cording to Agamben could be found in various 
political contexts and historical epochs. Thus, 
Agamben does not mean to reduce or negate 
these profound differences, but instead he tries 
to elucidate the common ground for these very 
different forms of government: the production 
of bare life. While other philosophers and his-
torians may insist that the camps of the Nazis 
are a logical exception or a historical epiphe-
nomenon, Agamben searches for the rule, or 
the normality, of this exception and asks in 
what sense “bare life” is an essential part of 
our contemporary political rationality.
 Here we are confronted with a second prov-
ocation. While for Agamben all politics is 
always already biopolitics, he claims that mo-
dernity is the biopolitical age par excellence, 
since it is only in modernity that exception 
and rule become ultimately indistinguishable. 
After the end of Nazism and Stalinism a new 
era of biopolitics comes into being. There is 
no simple historic continuity between totali-
tarian regimes and democratic states; instead 
Agamben notes an increasing aggravation of 
biopolitics. According to him, “biopolitics has 
passed beyond a new threshold” […]: “in mod-
ern democracies it is possible to state in public 
what the Nazi biopoliticians did not dare to 
say” (Agamben 1998: 165).
 While the Nazi biopolitics concentrated on 
identifi able individuals or specifi c subpopula-
tions, “in our age all citizens can be said, in a 
specifi c but extremely real sense, to appear vir-
tually as homines sacri” (Agamben 1998: 111). 
Clearly, Agamben assumes that the borderline 
that once separated individuals or social groups 
is now to be found inside the individual body. 
The line of separation between political exist-
ence and bare life “moved inside every human 
life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer 
confi ned to a particular place or a defi nite cat-
egory. It now dwells in the biological body of 
every living being” (Agamben 1998: 140).
 Unfortunately, Agamben leaves this aggra-
vation of the biopolitical problem extremely 
vague. His thesis that rule and exception are 
marked by indeterminacy is coupled with a 
lack of conceptual differentiation. To be more 
concrete: Even if all subjects are homines sacri, 
they are so in very different ways. Agamben 
limits his argument by stating that everyone 
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is susceptible to being reduced to the status of 
“bare life” – without clarifying the mechanism 
of differentiation that distinguishes between 
different values of life. It remains woefully 
unclear to what extent and in what manner 
the comatose in the hospitals share the fate of 
prisoners in concentration camps; whether the 
asylum seekers in the prisons are bare life to 
the same degree and in the same sense as the 
Jews in the Nazi camps. Agamben privileges 
exaggerated dramatisation over sober evalu-
ation, since he even regards people killed on 
motorways indirectly as homines sacri (Ag-
amben 1998: 114; Khurana 2002). As I try to 
show in the following section, lacking the ca-
pacity to differentiate is not an accidental fault 
of the argument, but the necessary outcome of 
an analysis that systematically ignores central 
aspects of contemporary biopolitics.
3. Zone of indistinction or 
biopolitical continuum?
For Agamben the decision about life and death 
“no longer appears today as a stable border 
dividing two clearly distinct zones” (1998: 
122). This sentence allows for two completely 
different readings. If the accent is placed on 
the fi rst part of the phrase that stresses the dis-
solution of a clear demarcation line, the border 
is conceived as a fl exible zone or a mobile 
line. Or – this is the second interpretation – if 
the accent is put on the last part of the phrase, 
the phrase seems to indicate that there is no 
longer a borderline at all, that both domains 
have become indistinguishable. This is prob-
ably the direction that Agamben takes when 
he speaks of a “zone of indistinction”, the 
tendency towards identity of life and politics 
(1998: 122 resp. 148).
 But this leads into a blind alley. Agamben 
does not comprehend “camp” as an internally 
differentiated continuum, but only as a “line” 
(1998: 122) that separates more or less clearly 
between bare life and political existence. As 
a consequence, he cannot analyse how inside 
“bare life” hierarchisations and evaluations 
become possible, how life can be classifi ed and 
qualifi ed as higher or lower, as descending or 
ascending. Agamben cannot account for these 
processes since his attention is fi xed on the es-
tablishment of a border – a border that he does 
not comprehend as a staggered zone but as a 
line without extension that reduces the ques-
tion to an either-or. In other words: Agamben 
is less interested in life than in its “bareness”, 
whereby his account does not focus on the 
normalisation of life, but on death as the ma-
terialisation of a borderline. For Agamben bio-
politics is essentially “thanatopolitics” (1998: 
122; Fitzpatrick 2001: 263-265; Werber 2002: 
419).
 In fact the “camp” is by no means a homog-
enous zone where differences collapse but a 
site where differences are produced. Here again 
the contrast between Agamben and Foucault 
is instructive. For Foucault biopolitics is not 
a sovereign decision over life and death. The 
historical and political novelty of biopolitics 
lies in the fact that it focuses on the produc-
tive value of individuals and populations; the 
ancient sovereign power that was centred on 
death is reorganised around the imperative 
of life. In this perspective Foucault analyses 
modern racism as a vital technology since it 
guarantees the function of death in an economy 
of bio-power. Racism allows for a fragmenta-
tion of the social that facilitates a hierarchical 
differentiation between good and bad races. 
The killing of others is motivated by the vi-
sion of an improvement or purifi cation of the 
higher race (Foucault 1997: 213-235). From 
this point, the second difference between Ag-
amben and Foucault emerges. Agamben claims 
that from antiquity on there was a structural 
link between sovereignty and biopolitics, lead-
ing to an always renewed and ever more radi-
calised separation between bare life and legal 
existence. Foucault, on the other hand, makes 
an analytical distinction between biopolitics 
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and sovereignty, even though he notes their 
“deep historical link” (Foucault 1991: 102). 
Only the Foucauldian analytical frame allows 
the material limits and the historical specifi ty 
of sovereignty to become visible by presenting 
it less as the origin than as an effect of power 
relations.
 Foucault shows that sovereign power is 
by no means sovereign, since its legitimacy 
and effi ciency depends on a “microphysics 
of power”, whereas in Agamben’s work sov-
ereignty produces and dominates bare life. 
For Agamben “the production of a biopoliti-
cal body is the original activity of sovereign 
power” (1998: 6; emphasis in orig.). The bi-
nary confrontation of bíos and zoé, political ex-
istence and bare life, rule and exception points 
exactly to the very juridical model of power 
that Foucault has criticized so convincingly. 
Agamben pursues a concept of power that is 
grounded in categories of repression, reproduc-
tion and reduction, without taking into account 
the relational, decentralised and productive 
aspect of power. In that it remains inside the 
horizon of law, Agamben’s analysis is more 
indebted to Carl Schmitt (1932) than to Michel 
Foucault. For Schmitt, the sovereign is visible 
in the decision about the state of exception, in 
the suspension of the law, while for Foucault 
the normal state that operates beneath, along-
side, or against juridical mechanisms is more 
important. While the former concentrates on 
how the norm is suspended, the latter focuses 
on the production of normality. Schmitt takes 
as the point of departure the very sovereignty, 
that signifi es, for Foucault, the endpoint and 
result of complex social processes, which con-
centrate the forces inside the social body in 
such a way as to produce the impression that 
there is an autonomous centre, or a sovereign 
source of power.6
6  For a systematic comparison between Foucault’s and 
Agamben’s conception of biopower: Genel 2003; see 
also Nikolopoulou 2000. 
4. Political economy of life
Agamben sees the novelty of the modern bio-
politics in the fact that “the biological given is 
as such immediately political, and the political 
is as such immediately the biological given” 
(1998: 148; emphasis in orig.). In the political 
program of the Nazis, the preoccupation with 
life is at the same time a struggle against the 
enemy. While there are probably convincing 
reasons to state that in the present we are one 
step further on the way towards a politicisation 
of nature, there are at least two major problems 
that this conception of biopolitics fails to ad-
dress. Firstly, Agamben does not take into 
account that the site of sovereignty has been 
displaced. While in the eugenic programs in 
the fi rst half of the 20th century biopolitical in-
terventions were mainly executed by the state 
that controlled the health of the population or 
the hygiene of the race, biopolitics today is 
becoming more and more a responsibility of 
sovereign subjects. As autonomous patients, 
active consumers or responsible parents they 
demand medical or biotechnological options. 
Today, it is less the state that regulates by 
direct interventions and restrictions, since the 
capacity and competence of decision-making is 
increasingly ascribed to the individual subject 
to make “informed choices” beyond political 
authoritarianism and medical paternalism. De-
cisions on life and death are less the explicit 
result of legal provisions and political regula-
tions but the outcome of an “invisible hand” 
that represents the options and practices of 
sovereign individuals (Lemke 2002b; Koch 
2002). Agamben’s analysis is too state-cen-
tred, or rather, it relies on a limited conception 
of the state which does not take into account 
important political transformations since the 
Nazi era. He does not take into account that in 
contemporary liberal societies political power 
is exercised through a multiplicity of agencies 
and techniques that are often only loosely as-
sociated with the formal organs of the state. 
The self-regulating capacities of subjects as 
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autonomous actors have become key resources 
for present forms of government that rely in 
crucial respects on forms of scientifi c expertise 
and knowledge (Rose/Miller 1992).
 Agamben’s concept of biopolitics is marked 
by a second weakness that also demonstrates 
his excessively legalistic approach. Biopoliti-
cal mechanisms confront not only those who 
have been deprived of elementary rights and 
reduced to the status of living beings. The 
analysis of biopolitics cannot be limited to 
those without legal rights, such as the refugee 
or the asylum seeker, but must encompass all 
those who are confronted with social processes 
of exclusion – even if they may be formally 
enjoying full political rights: the “useless”, 
the “unnecessary”, or the “redundant”. While 
in the past these ominous fi gures inhabited 
only peripheral spaces in the so-called third 
and fourth world, today in a global economy 
these forms of exclusion can also be found in 
the industrialised centres. As a result of the 
crisis of the welfare state and Fordist modes of 
social integration, more and different segments 
of the populations are effectively excluded not 
only from labour and the working process but 
from education, housing and social life (Castel 
2000; Imbusch 2001).
 By concentrating on questions of law and 
the fi gure of the sovereign ban, Agamben ig-
nores central aspects of contemporary bio-
politics. He takes for granted that the state of 
exception is not only the point of departure for 
politics, but its essence and destination. In this 
light, politics is reduced to the production of 
homines sacri – a production that in a sense 
has to be called non-productive since bare life 
is only produced to be suppressed and killed. 
But biopolitical interventions cannot be lim-
ited to registering the opposition of bare life 
and political existence. Bare life is no longer 
simply subject to death; it falls prey to a bio-
economical imperative that aims at the increase 
of life’s value and the optimalisation of its 
quality. Contemporary biopolitics is essen-
tially political economy of life that is neither 
reducible to state agencies nor to the form of 
law. Agamben’s concept of biopolitics remains 
inside the ban of sovereignty, it is blind to all 
the mechanisms operating beneath or beyond 
the law (see also Bröckling 2003).7
5. Conclusion: biopower 
and thanotopolitics
Our reading of Agamben leads to a surprising 
result. Following a binary code and a logic of 
subsumption that does not allow for differ-
entiations, his argument remains committed 
to exactly the juridical perspective that he so 
vividly criticizes. He reduces the “ambiguous 
terrain” (1998: 143) of biopolitics by operat-
ing with a notion of politics that is at once 
too broad in its explanatory scope and too 
narrow in empirical complexity. On the one 
hand Agamben conceptualises the political as 
a sovereign instance that does not allow for 
an outside that would be more than an “inner 
outside” and an “exception”. On the other hand 
his presentation of sovereignty is completely 
limited to the decision on the state of exeption 
and the killing of bare life.
 As a consequence, Agamben presents a 
distorted picture. The main danger today may 
not be that the body or its organs are targets 
of a distinctive state politics (1998: 164-5), 
but – quite the contrary – that we are witness-
ing an important transformation of the state 
under the sign of deregulation, privatisation 
and liberalisation. It is more and more the sci-
entifi c consultants, economic interest groups, 
and civil societal mediators that defi ne the 
7  Agamben also completely ignores to address the que-
stion whether the biopolitical production of „bare life” 
is also a patriarchal project. Indeed, the strict border 
line between natural life and political existence very 
much resembles the heterosexual order and a gendered 
division of labor that reduces women to “bare life” (for 
a feminist critique of Agamben’s account: Deuber-Man-
kowski 2002) 
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beginning, the end, and the value of life, in 
consensus conferences, expert commissions, 
and ethical counsels. This “withdrawal of the 
state” could itself be analysed as a political 
strategy, though one that does not necessar-
ily refuse individuals legal rights. In a more 
moderate account of exceptionality the suspen-
sion of legal rights might remain important in 
determining who is allowed to become part of 
a community, who is eligible to legal rights at 
all. The political strategy, however, that shifts 
legal and regulatory competencies from the 
public and legal domain to the private sphere, 
will probably pose a much greater threat in the 
future. This tendency is already visible; for ex-
ample, it is possible for private companies to 
own and exploit human body substances (see 
Andrews/Nelkin 2001). Moreover, this ten-
dency can already be traced in examples that 
Agamben mentions, namely the admissibility 
of euthanasia and transplantation medicine. 
Here we can expect that a patient’s legal will 
and contract relations will take the place of 
explicit state prohibitions and regulation. We 
note that in some countries there is already a 
public discussion to provide fi nancial com-
pensations for individuals who donate organs, 
and there is a growing consensus in the legal 
community to accept the will of the patient not 
to prolong life under certain conditions.8
 By the analytical focus on a formal and 
repressive conception of the state and the 
theoretical fi xation on the sovereign border 
between life and death, Agamben fails to see 
the limits of his own argumentation. Not every 
8  See Norris 2000: 52-3: „Though Agamben does not 
discuss it, one of the best examples of this collapse of the 
rule into the exception and of politics into life may be 
the corporate investigation and purchase of the human 
genome. The day is at hand when the decision on the 
human being will become the rule. The defi nition of the 
human being, like that of death, will become too fl uid 
to serve as a guide for the judgement on its modifi cati-
ons, and lawyers, scientists, and political theorists will 
simply not be able to chart the expansion of our present 
boundaries into the dark seas that confront us.”
single form of exclusion needs to be grounded 
in legal regulations, or necessitate a suspension 
of law. Sovereignty does not only reside in 
political instances and state agencies, it also 
dwells in “life politics” (Giddens 1991: 209-
31) of sovereign subjects who are expected 
to act in a autonomous ways as individuals. 
We are not only subjected to political mecha-
nisms that regulate and restrict our physical 
life; we are also inscribed in what Foucault 
called “arts of government” that direct how to 
refl ect ourselves as moral persons and parts of 
collective subjectivities (see Foucault 2004a). 
In fact, Foucault regarded biopolitics as an 
essential part of the liberal art of government 
(see Foucault 2004b, pp. 3-28).
 Yet, although the social dynamics of the 
relations between bare life and political ex-
istence, between technologies of the self and 
political rationalities, remain theoretically un-
derdeveloped in Agamben’s work, his theory 
recognises that it is not suffi cient to simply 
extend legal rights to those excluded. What 
is needed, however, is what Foucault called a 
“new right” (1997: 35) that suspends the dif-
ference between human being and citizen and 
overcomes a legal concept that permanently 
re-inscribes the separation between natural 
existence and political life.
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